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I Introduction
i) Voices From the Period, Research Both Gain Momentum
In Japan since the 1990s, recollections of people who took part in
the social movements of the 1960s and books by historians are being
published one after another. This is at least in part because those
participants have been approaching retirement age at around 60, and
reﬂecting back on their youth. In the United States, meanwhile, many
works positively appraising the social movements of the 1960s have
started to appear in reaction to the appearance since the conservative
wave of the 1980s of research taking a negative view, depicting the
1960s as the start of the “collapse of traditional values” or the formation
of “big government.” To summarize, now in the early 21st century
research on the 1960s is not only abundant but has a polemical
character. This makes it all the more important that we consider how to
synthesize the invaluable recollections of participants into broader
historical research, andbecause of the very polemical nature of the
historical debatethat we make serious e#orts to collect primary
sources and to empirically establish the historical facts.
ii) The “Long Sixties” Approach and Periodization
While almost all of the radical social movements of the 1960s
seeking political revolutions ended in failure in the 1970s, some
movements, such as environmental protection and women’s liberation,
lived on, leading to the recent rise of the “long Sixties” approach, which
sees the social movements of that decade as beginning earlier and
189
ending later. In the United States, this approach treats the period from
the beginning of the civil rights movement in around 1955 until the end
of the radical Native American movement in 1973 as one continuum. In
Western Europe, similarly, Arthur Marwicke treats the period from
1958 to 1974 as the “long Sixties.” (1) We can see that viewing the origins
and impact of the social movements of the 1960s as part of a longer
period characterizes the “long Sixties” approach.
Applying this approach to the Japanese student movement brings
the period from the appearance in 1958 of the anti-Communist Party
“New Left” to the decline of the New Left with the outbreak of the
United Red Army incident in 1972 into focus. Moreover, if we shift our
attention to the “Old Left” comprised of such groups as the Japan
Socialist Party and Japan Communist Party, we can see everything from
1955, when the left and right wings of the Socialist Party united and it
became clear that the Communist Party had renounced the armed
struggle line, until the end of progressive metropolitan government in
Tokyo in 1979 as one era. It should go without saying, of course, that
other periodizations are possible if we focus on movements such as
environmental protection and women’s liberation, and that
periodization itself is a contentious issue.
In the United States, there is also a strain of research that takes a
positive approach to movements such as the Students Non-Violent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS) based on a nonviolent approach and a critical view of the period of
radicalization that began in the latter half of the 1960s with calls for
Black Power and Student Power. In Japan, meanwhile, after the rise of
the movement against the revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty in
1960, there was a period of stagnation until momentum was regained
around 1965 with the movement against the Vietnam War. Following
the university struggle of 196869, the movement faded away with the
automatic renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1970. All of this
makes periodization within the “long Sixties” an important issue. There
is also the issue of how the special characteristics of 1968, which saw the
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rise of student movements not only in Japan but also in Western Europe
and the United States, should be positioned within the 1960s as a whole.
iii) The Focus and Limitations of This Paper
My goal in this paper is, by highlighting di#erences in the recent
upsurge of studies in the United States and Japan on the social
movements of the 1960s, particularly the student movements, to clarify
the questions on which we need to focus to move forward in empirical
research. In this connection, I would like to focus in particular in
di#erences between the New Left in Japan and the United States. For
the sake of clarity, I will refer to the movement in Japan by its Japanese
name, Shin-Sayoku, and reserve the term New Left for the movement in
the United States.
Recollections by participants in the Japanese Shin-Sayoku
movement, while they contain valuable information unknown to
anyone else, have a strongly partisan character. Accordingly, to make
use of these recollections in historical research it is necessary to
construct a political-social or political-cultural historical approach
putting the political movements of that period into the context of social
and cultural trends as a whole. In this respect, there are many things we
can learn from American scholarship. In recent years, there have been
many U.S. empirical studies focusing on the origins of conservative
reaction to radical movements in changing racial, ethnic, and class
relations in speciﬁc cities in the 1960s. In the case of Japan as well, there
is a need for a re-examination in the broad context of political-social and
political-cultural history of whether the socialist revolution proclaimed
by various Shin-Sayoku factions was a realistic goal, given that the
1960s saw high-speed economic growth and the stabilization of
long-term Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP) power under the Ikeda and
Sato administrations.
II Between Shin-Sayoku and New Left
In Japan, there is a tendency to emphasize the similarities between
the Shin-Sayoku and New Left movements, due in part because of the
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similarity of their names. However, if one examines SDS, a group seen
as representative of the New Left, it is the di#erences that stand out.
First of all, all left-wing organizations were bu#eted by the winds of the
red-baiting McCarthyism that swept through America in the 1950s.
When SDS was formed in 1960, for example, it came into being as the
student wing of the League for Industrial Democracy, a social
democratic organization, but, amid criticism of Cold War policies,
distanced itself from the parent organization’s anti-communist stand,
becoming a broad-based progressive organization including a left-liberal
wing. The SDS was initially not a group seeking socialist revolution,
and its 1962 manifesto, the Port Huron Statement, called for the
progressive transformation of the Democratic administration’s policies
through participatory democracy, including mass direct action. The
group, moreover, was a loose confederation of SDS branches at
universities, rather than the typical Old Left-type organization with a
central decision-making authority.
In Japan, meanwhile, the event seen as the birth of the Shin-Sayoku
movement is the 1958 formation of the Communist Bund. While this
organization criticized Stalinism, broke with the Japan Communist
Party, and proclaimed the formation of a “true Marxist-Leninist
vanguard party,” it paid more attention to mass direct action than to
doctrinal unity. The group won attention for carrying out direct actions
such as forcing its way into the Diet during the 1960 struggle over the
revision of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, but most of its
leaders were arrested, and the group fractured with the ratiﬁcation of
the treaty. In the sense that the formation of the Communist Bund
represented the formation of a Marxist-Leninist political party modeled
on the Russian Revolution apart from the Communist Party, it
symbolized the diversiﬁcation of the Communist movement. The group
was also signiﬁcant for advocating a leading role for the student
movement, and contributing to the rise of the 1960 Security Treaty
struggle. In terms of its platform and organization, however, the group
was part of the Marxist-Leninist lineage, with some calling it “the last of
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the Old Left.” (2) Later Shin-Sayoku groups fractured into many sects,
most of them sharing the same tendencies as the Communist Bund.
As we have seen, the New Left and Shin-Sayoku began with major
di#erences in goals and organizational structure. From the latter half of
the 1960s, however, as a result of the SDS’s radicalization and turn
toward socialism along with the radicalization of the African-American
movement and the spread of the movement against the Vietnam War, it
is a fact that the American and Japanese movements came to share more
in common. In the United States, as a result of the continuation of
economic and social discrimination in the northern cities even after the
legal abolition of racial discrimination with the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, from 1966 the African-American community, rather
than relying on the Democratic administration, began advocating Black
Power as a means of self-realization, and groups arose such as the Black
Panther Party supporting armed self-defense.
As a result, the Black Nationalist movement, which valued the kind
of self-reliance advocated by Malcolm X and in some cases was prepared
to engage in armed self-defense, became an increasingly visible strand of
the black liberation movement, in competition with the kind of
movement of non-violent resistance advocated by Dr. Martin Luther
King. However, although armed self-defense itself is not illegal in the
United States with its constitutional right to bear arms, adoption of this
approach led to many violent clashes with the police, and it is a fact that
this led to the decline of the movement. Moreover, with the
intensiﬁcation of the Vietnam War, the anti-draft movement gained
momentum among students and their clashes with police become more
intense. In line with this, white students began to call for Student Power
and SDS took a more confrontational stance toward the Democratic
administration, increasingly calling for transformation of the system
and taking on greater socialist tendencies. However, even after its
radicalization the American student movement maintained its stance of
placing value on improving communities and universities, so despite the
struggles of the 1960s such as university occupations, the movement
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won lasting gains such as university-established departments of
Afro-American Studies and Ethnic Studies.
III Contrasts Between First, Second Halves of the Decade
In the United States, scholars working from a liberal perspective
tend to take a positive stance toward the movements of the ﬁrst half of
the 1960s that, based on nonviolent resistance, sought a transformation
in the policies of Democratic Party administrations, and to be critical of
radicalized later movements. In Japan, as well, researchers point to
changes in the character of the movements between the ﬁrst and second
halves of the decade. According to Oguma Eiji, for example, who
published his masterwork 1968 in 2009, because the leaders of the
Shin-Sayoku groups such as the Communist Bund that led the Security
Treaty struggle of 1960 were born before or during the Paciﬁc War and
grew up during a period when Japan was still poor and memories of the
war were still dormant, their opposition to the Security Treaty was
rooted in a desire to overcome “modern unhappiness” through liberation
from poverty and dictatorial rule. By contrast, Oguma says the
Zenkyoto (All Campus Joint Struggle) movement that rose in 196869
was rooted in a desire to overcome “contemporary unhappiness”
originating in the alienation of managed society in the period of high
economic growth.(3)
There was, in fact, a change in emphasis between the Japanese
student movement of the ﬁrst half of the 1960s, which focused on
nationwide issues such as opposition to the Security Treaty and to the
Treaty on Basic Relations Between Japan and the Republic of Korea,
and the movement of the latter half of the decade, which combined local
campus issues such as opposition to tuition increases and undemocratic
administration into a nationwide struggle. Moreover, in the Zenkyoto
struggle at the University of Tokyo, what began with limited issues
such as the demand for reversal of unfair punishments in the medical
school widened into calls for self-denial and demands for such things as
the dissolution of “imperialist universities,” and saw the occupation of
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buildings across the campus. As a result, with no room left for
compromise, the movement ended in a violent clash between students
occupying the university’s central Yasuda Hall and the police. In that
process, the students who took part in the occupation began to describe
the university as a “knowledge factory,” reject their own
“manufacturing” into an intellectual elite, and emphasize the goal of
dismantling the university as an institution contributing to the
“imperialist system.”
The idea of incorporating this kind of “logic of self-denial” into a
political movement had stronger existentialist than Marxist tendencies,
and was a characteristic not seen in American student movements. As
a result, while the Zenkyoto movement won the hearts of many
students, it left no room for compromise with the university authorities
and ended in a self-sacriﬁcing violent clash, so we must judge the results
as ambiguous at best.
IV Old Vs. New Left
In Japan, there were clearly major di#erences between the Old Left
and the Shin-Sayoku Movement over the best way to proceed with the
movement against the 1960 revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty.
The People’s Conference Against Revision of the Security Treaty, which
the Japan Socialist Party and Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions of
Japan) led and in which the Japan Communist Party participated as an
observer, was the nucleus of the movement. Students, led by the
Shin-Sayoku Movement, carried out independent activities against the
revision such as street demonstrations. When the LDP government of
Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke rammed the treaty through the Diet,
many citizens saw this as a “crisis of parliamentary democracy,” and the
opposition movement suddenly gained many new participants. It was
under these circumstances that the leaders of the Shin-Sayoku student
movement forced their way into the Diet, and in the process a female
student was killed and President Eisenhower cancelled a planned visit
to Japan. The Kishi Cabinet, as a result, had no choice but to resign en
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masse, but the treaty revision went into e#ect.
Most leaders of the Old Left took a positive view of this outcome,
seeing the resignation of Kishi, who had been a cabinet minister during
the Paciﬁc War and was named afterwards as a suspected war criminal,
as a rejection of any return to prewar-style reactionary politics and a
sign that “postwar democracy” had taken ﬁrm root. The Shin-Sayoku,
however, focusing on the passage of the Security Treaty, saw this as
indicating that the movement had collapsed. This also demonstrated
the tendency of the Shin-Sayoku to discount the value of parliamentary
democracy as, in the words of the movement’s ideological leader at the
time, Yoshimoto Takaaki, as nothing more than a tool of “bourgeois
democracy.” (4)
We can thus see that there was a decisive di#erence between the
Socialists and Communist parties of the Old Left, which comprised a
parliamentary left inclined to seek revolution through the
parliamentary system, and the Shin-Sayoku, which saw little value in
parliamentary politics and was in essence a leftist direct action
movement that sought revolution through the direct action of the
masses. This stands in stark contrast to the German New Left, many of
whose members went on to serve in Parliament as members of the Social
Democratic Party or Green Party, but the question is why Japan’s
Shin-Sayoku took an anti-parliamentarian line. The Japanese Old Left’s
tendency, on the other hand, to focus on politics in the voting booth
rather than in the streets, emphasizing e#orts to expand its inﬂuence in
the Diet, led it to clash even more harshly with the Shin-Sayoku than it
might have otherwise. This kind of conﬂict arose within the Japan
Communist Party as well, with part of the leadership of the Communist
faction within the student movement in the University of Tokyo
struggle of the late 1960s emphasizing direct action, leading to their
expulsion in 1972.
A group that held a unique position in this structure between the
Old Left and the Shin-Sayoku was Beheiren, or the Citizens’ Federation
for Peace in Vietnam. This organization was founded in 1965 under the
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leadership of intellectuals opposed to the Vietnam War such as Oda
Makoto and Tsurumi Shunsuke, but gained increasing inﬂuence among
students as well. This was a loose federation around the single issue of
opposition to the Vietnam War and sought to strengthen public opinion
against the war through teach-ins and peaceful demonstrations.
Beheiren resembled the early-period SDS in organization and activities
and, in fact, many of its leaders had either studied in the United States
or thought highly of American-style pragmatism. (5)
Beheiren was thus a pioneering organization among Japanese
citizens’ movements, and carried out unique activities, including e#orts
to forge cooperation between the Old Left and the Shin-Sayoku in
opposition to the Vietnam War and the US-Japan Security Treaty.
V International Factors Behind Radicalization of the Student
Movement
Behind the radicalization of the American student movementin
addition to the inﬂuence of the radicalization of the African-American
movement, as we have already discussedlay the fact that internal
campus struggles, even for expanded freedom in political activities as
seen in the Free Speech Movement at the University of California at
Berkeley in the fall of 1964, could not have been carried out without
occupying university buildings. At the same time, as the war in
Vietnam escalated the student movement incorporated the demand for
abolition of the draft, leading to increasing clashes with the police and,
out of a feeling of solidarity with the National Liberation Front in South
Vietnam groups came to the fore that attempted to apply a similar
national liberation war-type of revolutionary strategy in the United
States. This approach of taking a “Third World” type of armed struggle
as a model was inﬂuenced by events from the Cuban Revolution of 1959
to the Chinese Cultural Revolution beginning in 1966. The
Weatherman Group, which split from the SDS at the latter’s ﬁnal
convention in June 1969, was an example of this tendency. Attempting
to bring about revolution through street clashes and armed struggle in
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an “advanced country” with a parliamentary system, however, exposed
such groups to an intense police crackdown against their “illegal
activities,” leading to their collapse in the early 1970s.
In Japan, after students took over buildings at Keio University in
opposition to tuition increases in 1965, this tactic became widely used at
other universities, and escalated to the closure of an entire university
with the Zenkyoto movement in 1968. In addition, it was during the
October 1967 struggle at Haneda Airport to prevent Prime Minister
Sato from visiting South Vietnam that the violent groups known as
“geba-bo” (“geba” means German word Gewalt and “bo” means stick) and
helmeted activists made their ﬁrst appearances in Shin-Sayoku street
demonstrations, and from this point on, clashes between these violent
groups and the police became a regular thing. Once the police
intensiﬁed their crackdowns and demonstrations were increasingly
suppressed, however, groups began to appear that openly advocated
armed struggle with bombs and guns, such as the Red Army Faction,
which was formed in the fall of 1969. As shown in the United Red Army
incident in 1972, however, this kind of armed struggle line not only led
to defeat through the arrests of leaders and direct police suppression of
the movement, it also caused the atrophy of the Shin-Sayoku Movement
as a whole by giving rise to internal purges and violent clashes.
Increased interest in the Third World, of course, in addition to
inﬂuencing the radicalization of the student movements in places such
as Japan and the United States, was also important in spurring new
strands of thought, such as the trend in the United States toward seeing
domestic minorities as part of a global consciousness as a “Third World
Within,” and the rise of Postcolonial Studies. It should not be forgotten
that this interest in the Third World was a major stimulus to new
strands of thoughts and movements in both the United States and
Japan, where it had an inﬂuence on the formation of movements to end
the discrimination faced by Korean and Chinese residents of Japan and
advocating postwar compensation for the foreign victims of the Paciﬁc
War.
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The simultaneous appearance of student movements in 1968 in the
“advanced countries” of Japan, Western Europe and the United States,
and the relationship between “Third World elements” and “advanced
country” elements in the social movements of the 1960s are important
topics for research.
VI Atrophy of the Student Movement: a Japan-US Comparison
As we have already seen, the 1972 United Red Army incident was a
major cause of the atrophy of the Japanese Shin-Sayoku Movement. In
addition to resulting in a defeat for armed struggle, this shocking
incident led to many deaths and involved internal violence and purges
between members of fundamentally di#erent groups that had joined
forces to carry out armed strugglethe Red Army faction, which drew
on the Bund tradition of internationalism, and Maoist groups. It is clear
that this incident played a major role in the decline of the Shin-Sayoku
movement, as seen in survey of over 500 Zenkyoto movement
participants published in 1994. While 24 of the participants cited
internal violence as the reason why they left the movement, the next
biggest factor citedat 17was the United Red Army incident. (6)
It is probably for this reason that former leaders of the Shin-Sayoku
Movement have sought to analyze the causes of the United Red Army
incident and internal violence in general. Many of them have concluded
that participants’ belief that only their own faction was in the vanguard
of the movement caused them to reject the very existence of other
factions, leading to a tendency to seek even their physical extinction.
Because some participants recall having peaceful interaction with
members of other factions in the early 1960s, however, it can probably
be said that internal violence gained momentum only in the latter half
of the decade. Through the time of the 1960 Security Treaty struggle,
the movement was organized around autonomous student
organizations, and factions competed for power in elections for these
organizations. It can be said, however, that that from the Zenkyoto
period of the late 1960s, when alliances of activists with “ﬁghting spirit”
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became more central than the student organizations to the Shin-Sayoku
movement, internal democracy began to erode. Moreover, some have
pointed out that once the Shin-Sayoku Movement, which had originally
been critical of Stalinism, began to repeatedly carry out internal purges
it failed to put its anti-Stalinism into practice. We can say, accordingly,
that under the inﬂuence of the belief that only one’s own faction was in
the vanguard and of a model of organization that concentrated power in
the center, individual members lost the freedom to leave their factions
and purges were instituted that ignored human rights. This problem
can be seen in the context of the Shin-Sayoku Movement downplaying
the concept of respect for human rights established after citizens’
revolutions, deriding this idea as part of “bourgeois democracy.” While
there are some reports of fatalities arising from internal clashes in the
United States and Western Europe as well, there do not appear to have
been many calculated attacks with dangerous weapons on opposing
factions like those seen in Japan, a point requiring serious examination
for those concerned with the Shin-Sayoku Movement.
VII Some Conclusions
Finally, we need to place the student movement, for good and bad,
in the context of the history of the 1960s as a whole. It can be said, ﬁrst,
that the movement in both Japan and the United States, by playing a
central role in the movement against the war in Vietnam, made at least
some contribution toward bringing the war to an end. It is worthy of
attention that groups such as Beheiren developed a new consciousness
of solidarity in organizing opposition to the war, identifying with the
people of Vietnam not through a “victim consciousness” but through a
self-critical “aggressor consciousness.”
Second, it should be pointed out that, because the US student
movement not only sought revolutionary goals but also demanded
reforms in the curriculum such as the establishment of Ethnic Studies
departments, American universities underwent major changes from the
1970s onward. There is a major contrast in this respect with the
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Japanese student movement which, with its radicalization in the late
1960s, ignored the need for individual reforms, and left behind no major
results in terms of university transformation. It is worth noting that
with America’s deep-seated spirit of pragmatism, there is a tendency to
give importance to the accumulation over time of individual reforms,
and that even radical groups had a tradition of focusing on the
improvement of the communities in which their members lived, as seen
in the Black Panther Party’s demand for free lunches at schools in
African-American areas.
Third, in the Japanese case it is striking that, despite the many
social movements that arose in the 1960s, at the level of parliamentary
politics the LDP maintained control of government for many years. A
close examination of support rates shows, however, that the ratio of
absolute support for the LDP versus the oppositionwhich was 47.5 to
24.1 in 1955narrowed to an almost equal 32.3 to 31.8 in 1969.(7) While
part of the reason for this change can be seen in the trend toward party
diversiﬁcation under which parties such as Komeito (Clean Government
Party) and the Japan Communist Party won more seats in the Diet, there
was also an increase in people who supported no party at all, which
illustrates the insu$cient linkages between the rise of the social
movements of the 1960s and parliamentary politics. This brings into
relief the fact thatbecause of the clash between the Japanese
Shin-Sayoku movement’s anti-parliamentary tendencies and the old
left’s contrasting focus on parliamentary politicsno broad reformist
coalition was established. This is surely related to the fact that both the
Old Left and Shin-Sayoku in Japan had an extremely factional
character, and it was extremely di$cult for them to unite around broad
principles.
Fourth, in the course of opposing the Vietnam War American social
movements gave birth to a counterculture movement, resulting in
lasting changes in lifestyles and family structure. American social
movements thus, even if they failed to cause a political revolution,
brought about a major cultural revolution, including the transformation
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of universities that we touched upon earlier. In the Japanese case,
however, it would be di$cult to say that the political movements of the
1960s led to any cultural revolution such as a major transformation in
mass culture, despite the appearance of scattered phenomena such as
the “folk guerrillas” who arose out of Beheiren. The reasons for this
di#erence are also a major topic for future research.
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